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CREEPING BY MOONLIGHT: A LOOK AT CIVIL
COMMITMENT LAWS FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATORS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE YELLOW
WALLPAPER
ABSTRACT
This note examines the constitutional and social implications
of the civil commitment of sexually violent predators in the United
States. These commitments are implemented on sexual offenders
deemed too dangerous to be placed back into society after serving
prison sentences and have been gaining popularity across the United
States. Currently, these commitments are considered constitutional
in limited circumstances by the Supreme Court, but while these com-
mitments are meant for only the most dangerous and least controlla-
ble individuals, the public reaction to sexual offenses increases the
possibility these commitments will be misused. As a part of examin-
ing this commitment process, this note analyzes the short story, The
Yellow Wallpaper, a first hand fictive account of a woman undergoing
the rest cure, an eighteenth century medically accepted treatment for
women suffering a variety of mental ailments, which isolated women
and left them to sleep, eat, and do little else.
Today, women look back on this "cure" and wonder how it could
have ever been considered an appropriate medical treatment. This
story of one woman's confinement to a room as a part of a medically
accepted treatment offers a different angle on the situation men face
today under changing sexual offender laws and medically accepted
treatment programs. By comparing this treatment of women submit-
ted to the rest cure both in The Yellow Wallpaper and in Victorian
society to the current constitutional treatment of men submitted to
commitment for sexually violent offenses, this note hopes to show
how medically accepted treatment regimes with little or no individual
treatment are socially and morally dangerous. In the end, there are
better alternatives to commitment of sexual offenders that will keep
society safe, provide individualized treatment, and uphold constitu-
tional liberties so valued by our society. Perhaps one day, a hundred
years from now, society will also look back on the commitment of sex-
ually violent predators as medically inappropriate and wonder how
it ever became the socially instituted procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote The Yellow Wallpaper in the
late 1800s, at a time when women's bodies were considered inferior
to men's, and school,1 work, and books2 were believed to cause women
serious mental maladies.3 The treatment developed to combat these
supposed mental abnormalities was called the rest cure, a method
which removed women from their "usual environment" and secluded
them in bed for weeks.4 The Yellow Wallpaper is the diary of a
woman whose doctor husband has decided she needs the rest cure,5
and the reader follows as this cure brings her closer to madness until
she finally has a complete breakdown.6
1. Ellen L. Bassuk, The Rest Cure: Repetition or Resolution of Victorian Women's
Conflicts?, 6 POETICS TODAY 245, 251-52 (1985).
2. John Harvey Kellogg, The Ladies' Guide in Health and Disease, Girlhood,
Maidenhood, Wifehood, Motherhood, in THE YELLOW WALLPAPER 155, 160 (Dale M.
Bauer ed., Bedford/ St. Martins 1998).
3. Id.; Denise D. Knight, Texts and Contexts in Gilman's World: A Biographical
Approach, in APPROACHES TO TEACHING GILMAN's "THE YELLOW WALL-PAPER" AND
HERLAND 17, 18 (Denise D. Knight & Cynthia J. Davis eds., 2003).
4. Bassuk, supra note 1, at 247-48.
5. Dale M. Bauer, Invalid Women, in THE YELLOW WALLPAPER, supra note 2, at
130, 130.
6. Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, The Pedagogical Imperative: Charlotte Perkins Gilman's
"T'he Yellow Wall-paper,"in THE PEDAGOGICAL WALLPAPER: TEACHING CHARLOTE PERKINS
GILMAN'S"THE YELLOW WALL-PAPER"1, 10-11 (Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock ed., 2003); Ann
Oakley, Beyond The Yellow Wallpaper, 5 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, 29, 31 (1997).
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The Yellow Wallpaper has become a mainstay in women's stud-
ies and women's literature courses, but the story can and has been
studied in many other academic departments, including medical
school and psychology courses.7 It is the goal of this note to show how
this story can be put to yet another application: the better under-
standing of how civil commitment laws for sexually violent predators
affect the men committed and why individualized treatment would
serve society better in the long run instead of commitment. This story
of one woman's confinement to a room as a part of a medically ac-
cepted treatment offers a different angle on the situation men face
today under changing sexual offender laws and medically accepted
treatment programs.8
Part I discusses The Yellow Wallpaper in the context of the rest
cure. First, this section will analyze the story before delving into a
more detailed discussion of the social conditions and medical beliefs
of the time, and in particular those beliefs of Dr. S. Weir Mitchell,
the man who developed the rest cure9 and treated Charlotte Perkins
Gillman. 0 This section will then briefly discuss the autobiographical
nature of the story before analyzing its use as a comment on the rest
cure.
Part II will examine civil commitment laws and sexual offender
definitions in depth, with particular focus on the laws of Kansas and
Texas. Kansas's laws are discussed because two cases from this state
define the constitutionality of civil commitment for sexual offenders."
On the other hand, Texas's laws are important because of the unique
outpatient approach to civil commitment, and while certain aspects
of this approach are preferable to traditional programs, dangers still
7. Weinstock, supra note 6, at 3-4.
8. See Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, What We Know and Don't Know About
Treating Adult Sex Offenders, in PROTECTING SociETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS
OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 101, 101 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond
eds., 2003) (claiming no knowledge of "controlled outcome studies of the treatment of
female sex offenders, who, in any case, form a very tiny proportion of the population of
sex offenders"); see also Roy B. Lacoursiere, Evaluating Offenders Under a Sexually
Violent Predator Law: The Practical Practice, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra, at 75, 76 (explaining that
"[flemale and adolescent offenders will... not be included, not because they are excluded
by these laws, but because their numbers in SVP [Sexually Violent Predator] settings
are still small").
9. Bassuk, supra note 1, at 247.
10. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, On the Reception of "The Yellow Wallpaper," in THE
YELLOW WALLPAPER, supra note 2, at 349, 349.
11. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000).
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lurk. 2 This section will detail the history and typical language of
statutes in states with commitment laws.
Part III will critique the use of civil commitment for sexually vio-
lent predators through the lens of The Yellow Wallpaper. First, this
section will discuss arguments made by the American Psychological
Association (APA) and mental health professionals about the impacts
of commitments and their ability to help those suffering sexual men-
tal illnesses. Second, this section will address recidivism rates for
sexual offenders as a reflection on the effectiveness of commitment
as the best way to protect society. Lastly, this section will give an ex-
ample of real sexual offenders living in society and suggest that pro-
viding hope of recovery and reintegration into society might reduce
recidivism and protect society more than commitment. Part IV will
conclude with an examination of alternative programs and solutions
for our growing population of sex offenders.
I. THE YELLOW WALLPAPER
The Yellow Wallpaper is a series of journal entries written by an
unnamed woman over a period of three months. 3 Her husband, John,
a doctor, has diagnosed her with a "temporary nervous depression -
a slight hysterical tendency" and instituted a treatment of rest, air,
tonics, exercise, isolation, and absolutely no writing or "work."'4 By
the middle of the first entry, the narrator has made clear that she
disagrees with John's diagnosis of her condition and his treatment:
5
"Personally, I disagree .... Personally, I believe that congenial work,
with excitement and change, would do me good."' 6 She also wonders
if the fact that John is a doctor, and will not listen to her, is a reason
for her persisting condition.'"
The narrator and her husband move to a country estate to
encourage her recovery, and they take an attic bedroom covered in
yellow wallpaper the narrator immediately finds distasteful, but
which John refuses to change.'" With John away during the day and
with nothing to do but rest, the narrator clandestinely keeps this
12. James A. Curry, Sex Crime Reforms in Texas, 1999-2003: A Legislative Analysis,
CRIM. LAW BULL., (Aug. 2005) at 11-12; Ronnie Hall, Comment, In the Shadowlands:
Fisher and the Outpatient Civil Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators" in Texas,
13 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 175, 176, 211 (2006).
13. Oakley, supra note 6, at 31.
14. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The Yellow Wallpaper, in THE YELLOW WALLPAPER,
supra note 2, at 41, 42.
15. Id. at 42.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id. at 43-44.
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journal and watches the patterns in the wallpaper.1" Before too long,
she discovers figures moving behind the bar-like patterns,' and begs
her husband to take her away from the house.1 He refuses, and the
journal entries become increasingly obsessed with the wallpaper and
increasingly less reliable.' "[S]he becomes convinced that there is a
woman... behind the yellow wallpaper waiting to get out, a woman
who creeps around the house and garden only by moonlight when no
one will see her."23
On the last day at the house, the narrator locks herself inside.24
As the day passes, she strips off as much of the paper as she can, in
order to set the creeping woman free.25 Later, when John returns and
finds the door locked, at first he either refuses to or cannot under-
stand what she has done with the key," and begs her to open the
door. When he finds the key at last,2" he opens the door to discover
his wife crawling around the room, all the yellow paper stripped from
the walls.29 Horrified, he asks what she is doing,30 to which she re-
plies: "I've got out at last .... [A]nd I've pulled off most of the paper,
so you can't put me back!"31 At that point her husband John, the
upstanding doctor, faints.32 The story ends with the narrator crawl-
ing over him as she continues her circles around the room, shoulder
pressed against the wall. 3
A. Victorian Nervous Disorders and the Rest Cure
When first published, this story was seen by contemporaries "as
a harrowing case study of neurasthenia." ' Neurasthenia, which is
19. Id. at 43-44, 47-49.
20. Id. at 50-52.
21. Id. at 50.
22. Id. at 50-56; see also Paula A. Treichler, Escaping the Sentence: Diagnosis and
Discourse in "The Yellow Wallpaper," 3 TULSA STUD. WOMEN'S LITERATURE 61, 72-73
(1984) (supporting the proposition that the narrator is unreliable because "the narrative
is unfolding in an impossible form"; she tells the reader she is always "sleeping, creeping,
or watching the wallpaper" so the reader wonders if at that point she would even be able
to keep a journal).
23. Oakley, supra note 6, at 31.
24. Gilman, supra note 14, at 57.
25. Oakley, supra note 6, at 31.
26. Treichler, supra note 22, at 73.
27. Gilman, supra note 14, at 58.
28. Id.; Treichler, supra note 22, at 73 (suggesting why it took so long to find the key).
29. Gilman, supra note 14, at 50; Oakley, supra note 6, at 31.
30. Gilman, supra note 14, at 58.
31. Id.
32. Id.; Oakley, supra note 6, at 31.
33. Gilman, supra note 14, at 58.
34. Treichler, supra note 22, at 64.
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also referred to as puerperal mania, 5 acute mania,36 or hysteria,"7
was a term used by Dr. S. Weir Mitchell and others to describe condi-
tions that might be better known today as post partum depression,
bipolar disorder, or anxiety disorder.39 The narrator in The Yellow
Wallpaper exhibits some of the classic symptoms of this disorder:
"exhaustion, crying, nervousness, synesthesia, anger, paranoia, and
hallucination." 40 As more and more women developed similar symp-
toms, Victorians became alarmed and sought a treatment: women suf-
fering these nervous disorders were unable to be effective mothers
or manage their households.4
The solution became the rest cure, originally developed by Dr. S.
Weir Mitchell for soldiers suffering "battle fatigue" after the end of
the Civil War,4' which was applied for the next half century or so to
women "suffering from battle fatigue on the homefront [sic]." Dr.
Mitchell believed that women's "inappropriate displays of feeling"
and expressions of emotion made them predisposed for nervous dis-
orders.44 At this time, Dr. Mitchell and others considered a woman's
35. Kellogg, supra note 2, at 171-73 (describing puerperal mania, a term used by Dr.
Kellogg to reference a mental illness which "show[ed] itself about two weeks after delivery
[of a child]" with symptoms ranging from anxiety, irritability, and possible use of profanity,
to beliefs that evil had or was about to befall husband or child).
36. The symptoms of acute mania include insomnia, flushed complexion, rapid glances,
headaches, inability to produce enough milk, and distortion of the mind. Alfred Meadows,
"Perpetual Mania," A Manual of Midwifery, Including the Signs and Symptoms of
Pregnancy, Obstetric Operations, Diseases of the Puerperal State, etc, etc, in THE YELLOW
WALLPAPER, supra note 2, at 173, 175.
37. Hysteria was a common term "for a variety of nervous disorders, ranging from
seizures to schizophrenia, attributed primarily to women." Bauer, Invalid Women, supra
note 5, at 144 n.11.
38. Id. at 156 (highlighting editors' comparison of puerperal mania to post-partum
depression).
39. See DAVID H. BARLOW & V. MARK DURAND, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN
INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 113, 155 (3rd ed. 2002) (noting that anxiety disorders can range
from a general inability to stop worrying, to panic attacks, and phobias); Dale M. Bauer,
Introduction: Cultural and Historical Background, in THE YELLOW WALLPAPER, supra
note 2, at 3, 4 (suggesting the narrator's condition might be known today as "manic-
depressive illness"); see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 382-97 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the diag-
nostic symptoms of bipolar disorder, previously known as manic-depressive illness).
40. Treichler, supra note 22, at 65; see also 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
3148 (6th ed. 2007) (defining "synesthesia" as "[tihe production of a mental sense
impression relating to one sense by the stimulation of another sense, as in coloured
hearing').
41. See Bauer, supra note 39, at 10-13 (describing turn of the century alarm at
women's growing intellectual life, expanding female sexuality, and reactions); Bassuk,
supra note 1, at 253-54.
42. Bassuk, supra note 1, at 247.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 249.
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body inferior to a man's.45 This theory was supported mainly on a
belief that a woman's reproductive organs "dominated" her nervous
system, making her more susceptible to diseases and mental illness.46
According to some texts of the day, physicians "attributed real health
problems to women's intellectual activities."47 This meant not read-
ing novels,4" not seeking education outside the home, and not doing
any intellectual work.49
The rest cure took these restrictions to the extreme in order to
return women back to proper health: Dr. Mitchell applied a regimen
of rest, isolation, and overfeeding over a matter of weeks:5°
'At first, and in some cases for four to five weeks, I do not permit
the patient to sit up or to sew or write or read, or to use the hands
in any active way except to clean the teeth... I arrange to have
the bowels and water passed while lying down, and the patient is
lifted onto a lounge for an hour... and then lifted back again into
the newly-made bed.' The nurse spoonfeeds the patient, gives
her a sponge bath, [and] administers vaginal douches .... To
offset the ill-effects of prolonged immobility and confinement to
bed, the patient was subjected to... passive exercises such as
massage, electricity, and hydrotherapy .... Tonics, stimulants
and nutriments were given to.. . promote digestion .... Once
under Mitchell's care and confined to bed, the patient was started
on an exclusive diet of milk, administered in four-ounce doses
every two hours .... 51
Once a woman had gained weight and rested fully, the treatment
ended with lessons on how to suppress emotions and live highly struc-
tured lives. 2
These steps were designed to "infantilize the patient so that she
acknowledged the paternal authority of the doctor." 53 She was taught
45. Id. at 251.
46. Id.; see also Bauer, supra note 39, at 14 (supporting the theory that female
sexuality was linked to mental illness); Bauer, supra note 5, at 144 n.11 (explaining
"Victorian medical and scientific communities linked women's sexual organs - their
'wandering wombs' - to a propensity for insanity").
47. Bauer, supra note 5, at 131.
48. See Kellogg, supra note 2, at 160.
49. Bassuk, supra note 1, at 251-52.
50. Id. at 252. "Its cornerstone was bed rest for six weeks to two months, but the
length of time and completeness of rest were individually determined." Id. at 247.
51. Id. (quoting S. WEIR MITCHELL, FAT AND BLOOD: AN ESSAY ON THE TREATMENT OF
CERTAIN FORMS OF NEURASTHENIA AND HYSTERIA 66 (John K. Mitchell, ed., J.B. Lippincott
Company 8th ed. 1900)) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 249.
53. Bauer, supra note 5, at 131.
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through this process that she did not and could not know what was
best for her.' However, for some women, including Charlotte Perkins
Gilman, these treatments did not help in the slightest.55 The constant
rest, inability to read or work, and the repression of their ideas lit-
erally drove them insane.56 Victorian ideals about motherhood and
family, coupled with the rest cure, kept women in "nursery-prisons"
where they could see the world through the bars on their windows
but were not allowed to be a meaningful part of it.
57
B. The Yellow Wallpaper as a Comment on the Rest Cure
After the birth of her daughter, Gilman felt an inability to be
near or care for her child. 8 Alarmed, she sought treatment from Dr.
Mitchell. 9 He put her to bed and after a month declared there was
nothing wrong with her.60 Before returning her to her family, Dr.
Mitchell gave her these instructions: "'[l]ive as domestic a life as
possible. Have your child with you all the time.'.. . 'Lie down an
hour after each meal. Have but two hours' [sic] intellectual life a day.
And never touch pen, brush, or pencil as long as you live."' 6 ' She
followed his advice for three months, and when she felt on the brink
of utter madness, she disregarded his advice, went back to work,62
left her husband, and moved to California.63 The Yellow Wallpaper
is a stylized, embellished version of her struggle with the rest cure
and her attempt to change Dr. Mitchell's opinion of his treatment of
mentally ill women. 4
54. Jonathan Crewe, Queering "The Yellow Wall-Paper" A Pedagogic View, in THE
PEDAGOGICAL WALLPAPER: TEACHING CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN'S'THEYELLOW WALL-
PAPER," supra note 6, at 47, 49.
55. Bassuk, supra note 1, at 245 (noting that another famous Victorian author who
suffered from an unsuccessful rest cure application was Virginia Woolf).
56. See id. at 252.
57. See Dale M. Bauer, Conduct Literature and Motherhood Manuals, in THEYELLOW
WALLPAPER, supra note 2, at 63, 65.
58. See CHARLOTrE PERKINS GILMAN, THE LIVING OF CHARLOTTE PERKINs GILMAN 96
(1990). "Be it remarked that if I did but dress the baby it left me shaking and crying...."
Id.
59. Knight, supra note 3, at 20.
60. GILMAN, supra note 58, at 96.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 96-97; Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Why I Wrote the Yellow Wallpaper?, in
THE YELLOW WALLPAPER, supra note 2, at 347, 348-49.
63. Knight, supra note 3, at 21.
64. Gilman, supra note 62, at 349. Gilman commented she wrote The Yellow Wallpaper
"to save people from being driven crazy" and considered the story successful when she
learned years later Dr. Mitchell had read it and changed the way he treated patients as
a result. Id.
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Through the narrator in The Yellow Wallpaper, Gilman was able
to express her own dissatisfaction with the rest cure.61 "[A]limost
from the first [the narrator's language] serve[s] to call into question
both the diagnosis of her condition and the rules established to treat
it." 66 This leads the reader to believe there is in fact something wrong
with the narrator, but "to doubt that the diagnosis names the real
problem."67 Gilman's story becomes, in the end, a "challenge to the
patriarchal diagnosis of women's condition" and "a public critique of
a real medical treatment." '
Misdiagnosis had "sentence[d]" Gilman, and others like her, to
'"isolation, deprivation, and alienation." 69 In the end, the reader comes
away from the story wondering if "the diagnosis of hysteria may be
a sham" or worse, "socially constituted."7 ° Her husband, according
to Weinstock, has tried to teach his wife the "correct" way to view her
symptoms,71 but by the end of the story the audience realizes that not
only has he failed, but he has created a worse situation for his wife.72
As a way to bring his wife around to his medically accepted way of
thinking, John dismisses and devalues her ideas and assessments
of her condition.73 This becomes another way she is infantilized by
his rest cure; 4 through this failed attempt to teach her, John de-
means her intelligence and "deflates her self-esteem," which only
"engenders resentment" in the narrator and "ultimately facilitates
[her] psychotic break."75
The rest cure, meant to discipline her body, had not "produce [d]
a concomitant subordination of mind" in the narrator as it suppos-
edly had in other women.76 "[D]eprived of the opportunity to express
herself and to engage in meaningful dialogue about her thoughts and
feelings, the narrator develops her own discordant interpretation of
her condition in secret." 77 This hidden interpretation is what, accord-
ing to Weinstock, creates the shocking ending, but also what sends
65. Bauer, supra note 39, at 26.
66. Treichler, supra note 22, at 66.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 68-69.
69. Id. at 69.
70. Id. at 70.
71. Weinstock, supra note 6, at 10.
72. Id. John fails because his wife "does not learn the lesson she is supposed to
learn ..... Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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a powerful message: maybe if John had listened to his wife or taken
her seriously, she would not have had a breakdown.7"
The narrator was not a typical Victorian woman because she
preferred writing to being with her child. 9 Her symptoms could be
seen as "social or political critiques [that] were 'treated' rather than
credited." ' This is one of the reasons this story has become a shin-
ing beacon of the feminist literary canon - the story "terminate[s]
an overlong historical succession of madwomen to the attic."' It
offers, according to Crewe, a lesson about "women's psychotherapeutic
'management' and its consequences." 82 More than that, it "teach[es]
a lesson to the reader about the destructive effects of gender inequal-
ity and communications breakdown through the fictive representation
of mental derangement and psychic crisis," 83 and as such is a perfect
tool to use in the discussion of civil commitment for sex offenders in
order to better understand mental illness.
II. THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUAL PREDATORS
In the last few decades the United States has seen a significant
increase in sexually motivated crimes." As a reaction to the horrific
nature of these crimes and media attention they receive, states have
developed a number of protective measures to keep these sexual
offenders, labeled sexual predators, from having the opportunity to
commit future crimes once released from jail." These measures in-
clude registration systems, community awareness initiatives, chemi-
cal castrations, and civil commitment programs for those considered
to be especially dangerous.o The impetus behind these measures
seems to be a public "demanding that sex offenders never recidivate
and declaring that any method of incarceration or deterrence is ac-
ceptable." In states with civil commitment laws, after people have
78. See id. at 10-11.
79. See Bassuk, supra note 1, at 253 (explaining that Victorian women "were told
only to strive for a domestic life focused on the needs of... children).
80. Crewe, supra note 54, at 49.
81. Id. 49-50.
82. Id. at 50.
83. Weinstock, supra note 6, at 11.
84. Introduction to PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS:
LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 8, at 3, 3.
85. See THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DANGEROUS SEx OFFENDERS: A
TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION vii (1999) [hereinafter
APA].
86. Preface to PROTECTING SociET FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW,
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 8, at XV, XV.
87. APA, supra note 85, at vii.
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served their sentences, the state can ask a court to civilly commit
offenders to mental hospitals or treatment programs. 88 This commit-
ment can last indefinitely89 and is currently constitutional.9"
These laws are purportedly meant for only the most dangerous
men who commit sexual crimes,9 and legislatures have been very
92
careful to draft statutes so they do not appear facially punitive.
However, in practice these laws are punitive, they are motivated by
outside pressures on the legal system including victims' families and
the media, and they do not take into account true medical and psycho-
logical definitions of sexual disorders.93 After reading The Yellow
Wallpaper, one should be wary of just what damage socially accepted
cures for mental illness can do when they are instituted on a general,
rather than individual basis.
A. History
Laws calling for the commitment of especially dangerous sexual
offenders are nothing new in the United States. Some states have had
commitment laws on the books since the 1930s and 1940s.94 By the
1960s, "more than 25 states had enacted sex offender commitment
laws, variously called 'sexual psychopath' laws, 'sexually dangerous
persons' acts, and 'mentally disordered sex offender' acts."9 Origi-
nally these statutes viewed commitment as an alternative to prison
and did not contemplate its use after completion of a prison sen-
tence.96 This was true until the 1970s when, because people never
seemed to be cured, these statutes became disfavored.9 7 By 1990, only
twelve states had not repealed their statutes.98 Then, in the mid
1990s, states began enacting new commitment laws out of "frustra-
tion with the criminal justice system's perceived inability to keep sex
88. Id.
89. See id. at 19 (stating that the 'law provides for confinement 'until such time as
the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person
is safe to be at large'").
90. Id. at viii.
91. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (defining sexually violent
predators).
92. Preface, supra note 86, at xv (describing reasons for civil commitment statutes).
93. APA, supra note 85, at vii-ix, 167-81.
94. Id. at 11-13, 27.
95. Id. at 11.
96. W. Lawrence Fitch & Debra A. Hammen, The New Generation of Sex Offender
Commitment Laws: Which States Have Them and How Do They Work?, in PROTECTING
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra
note 8, at 27, 28.
97. APA, supra note 85, at 11.
98. Id.
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offenders off the streets." 9 Currently, nineteen states and the District
of Columbia have sex offender commitment laws or bills pending. 100
Washington was the first state to enact this new breed of statute,
and although Kansas's cases were eventually taken to the Supreme
Court, Kansas copied the language of its commitment laws from
Washington, 11 which has also served as a model for several other
states. 102
Washington was also the first state to use the term "sexually
violent predator," now a common term in this area of law.' Wash-
ington law defines a "'sexually violent predator,"' or SVP as "any
person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts
of sexual violence . ,, 104 A crime of sexual violence typically can
mean"forcible rape, statutory rape, indecent liberties by forcible com-
pulsion or against a child under age 14, and other offenses deter-
mined to have been 'sexually motivated."' 10 ' "'Mental abnormality'
is defined as 'a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emo-
tional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the com-
mission of criminal sexual acts"' while the term "personality disorder"
has no general definition. 1°'
In Washington, and most states with SVP laws, a sex offender
only becomes eligible for this civil commitment at the expiration of
his prison sentence.107 At that time, the prosecuting attorney for the
jurisdiction "where the individual was convicted (or charged) or...
99. Fitch & Hammen, supra note 96, at 27-28.
100. Id. at 27 n.1 (listing states with commitment laws as: "Arizona (1997), California
(1996), District of Columbia (1948), Florida (1999), Illinois (1998), Iowa (1998), Kansas
(1995), Massachusetts (1999), Minnesota (1939, 1994), Missouri (1999), North Dakota
(1997), New Jersey (1999), South Carolina (1998), Virginia (enacted 1999; implementation
date, January 2001), Washington (1990), and Wisconsin (1994)"). More recently Nebraska
(2006), New Hampshire (2006), Pennsylvania (2003, aimed only at young offenders), and
Texas (1999, outpatient commitment program) have enacted civil commitment statutes.
See chart "Civil Commitment Around the Country" accompanying Monica Davey & Abby
Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O7/03/04/us/04civil.html (stating that New
York was considering passing a bill in March 2007).
101. Fitch & Hammen, supra note 96, at 29.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(16) (2008); see Fitch & Hammen, supra note 96, at
29 (quoting the 1990 version of Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute which
has since been amended, but not substantively changed).
105. Fitch & Hammen, supra note 96, at 29 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(4)
(1990)).
106. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (1990)).
107. See id.
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the state's Attorney General" files a petition for commitment. °8 Then
a proceeding is held to determine if there is probable cause for com-
mitment. l" If probable cause is found, the offender must be evaluated
by the state, or he may choose to be evaluated by an independent
expert.11° "[T]he state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
individual is a sexually violent predator.""1 If the State finds that
he meets this criteria, then he is held "'until such a time as the per-
son's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that
the person is safe to be at large.""' 2 Once offenders have been com-
mitted as SVPs, they are typically sent to state-run inpatient facili-
ties under the supervision of the state "mental health authority.""l1
This usually means spending commitment time in mental health
hospitals, or, in the case of certain states, special facilities within
the state prison system." 4
B. Constitutional Considerations
1. The Kansas Cases and the Supreme Court
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was purposely worded
very broadly, defining a "'sexually violent predator' as "any person
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual
violence.""' 5 The first case to test this language all the way to the
Supreme Court was Kansas v. Hendricks."' Leroy Hendricks was a
man with over forty years of child molestation convictions on his rec-
ord, including the molestation of his own step children.'17 He had
been on a ten year sentence for molesting two boys and about to be
released to a halfway home when Kansas decided to try to have him
civilly committed." 8 He admitted that he could not control his desires
for children at times of high stress, and the Kansas court determined
108. Id. at 29-30.
109. Id. at 30.
110. Id. at 29-30.
111. Id. at 30.
112. Id. (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.100 (1990)).
113. Id. at 32-33.
114. Id. at 33.
115. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2008).
116. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Note, The
Need for Coherence: States' Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v.
Crane, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2229, 2240-41 (2003).
117. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354-55; Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2240.
118. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354.
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that his pedophilia could count as a mental abnormality and com-
mitted him." 9
At the Supreme Court, a majority held that civil commitment
of sexual offenders was not criminal punishment and as such did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the constitution or constitute
Double Jeopardy. 2 ° It justified this decision by finding the act did
"not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct," but rather used it
"solely for evidentiary purposes" and therefore served neither the
retributive nor deterrent features of the criminal law.'2 ' In reality,
this use of past behaviors to commit a person "blurs the line between
civil commitment and criminal incarceration ... ,, 122
Under the Kansas statute, the state was required to prove the
offender to be committed had a mental abnormality that made "it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous be-
havior."'2 This focus on mental abnormality was designed to limit the
person's eligibility for commitment, but the Court determined these
abnormalities did not have to match or relate to psychological cate-
gories of diagnosis."' This was because mental health professionals
disagree on definitions and courts have always allowed legislatures
to determine their own mental illness categories and definitions.'25
Although the state conceded it could offer Hendricks no real treat-
ment through civil commitment, the majority determined that this did
not make the statute punitive and, in fact, that the state was consti-
tutionally justified in committing Hendricks because of the danger
he presented.'
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy defended the constitution-
ality of the statute, but rejected the idea that Kansas did not have to
try to treat Hendricks.'27 He warned that while Hendricks's commit-
ment was constitutional based on the facts of his case, if future cases
presented evidence that the commitment was sought purely for ret-
ribution or deterrence purposes, or if it was shown mental abnormal-
ity was too vague a term to be trusted, civil commitment of sexual
predators would no longer be constitutional.'28 Even Justice Breyer's
119. Id. at 355-56.
120. Id. at 360-62, 368-71.
121. Id. at 361-62.
122. ANDREWJ. HARRIS, CIVIL COMMITMENTOFSEXUALPREDATORS: ASTUDYIN POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION 50 (2005).
123. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
124. Id. at 358-60; HARRIS, supra note 122, at 53.
125. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
126. Id. at 365-66; APA, supra note 85, at 30.
127. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring); APA, supra note 85,
at 31.
128. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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dissent did not find the Kansas law per se unconstitutional or crimi-
nal,'29 but Breyer did point out three similarities between commit-
ments and criminal punishments, ultimately concluding they were
not enough to transform commitment into criminal punishments.130
Breyer also argued that Kansas's statute was punitive, at least as ap-
plied to Hendricks because "he had a condition for which treatment
was available."'' Furthermore, Justice Breyer argued that a statute
is punitive when a state can treat someone, but chooses to delay that
treatment until the end of a criminal sentence.'32 Much debate has
raged about these issues, but nothing has been settled.'33
Despite Kennedy's warnings, prosecutors in Kansas and all states
with these laws "assumed that the Act had passed constitutional
muster.... "" Since this ruling was handed down, "the number of
sex offenders committed in Kansas ballooned from twelve in August
1998 to sixty-five in June 2001. As of January 2002... only three
SVPs had been conditionally released. Nationally... the number
of SVPs held in states with .. similar ... Act[s] rose from 523 to
around 1200." 1"5
In 2002, Michael Crane's appeal of Kansas's attempt to have
him civilly committed was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court,
allowing the justices another opportunity to assess the constitution-
ality of sexual offender civil commitment.' Michael Crane's story is
much different than Leroy Hendricks's: one day Crane showed him-
self to a female employee at a tanning salon and masturbated in front
of her. 137 When she reached for a phone to call authorities, he left,
telling her "'you could have had this, baby . . . ,,,13 Later that day,
he was in a video store being helped by another female employee.
When she became distracted from helping him find a video he had re-
quested, he came over to her with his pants around his ankles, picked
her up and carried her to the back of the store where he tried to force
129. See id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see APA, supra note 85, at 31.
130. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 379-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer compared
the "'secure' confinement" of civil commitments to penal incarcerations, pointing out that
commitment is reserved only for those who are already in the criminal justice system,
and that the commitment procedure necessarily involves the same prosecutors and gov-
ernment officials as traditional criminal punishments. Id.; APA, supra note 85, at 31.
131. APA, supra note 85, at 31 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
132. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 390-95.
133. APA, supra note 85, at 31-32.
134. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2242.
135. Id. (footnotes omitted).
136. See id. at 2265.
137. State v. Crane, 918 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Kan. 1996); Pfaffenroth, supra note 116,
at 2230.
138. State v. Crane, 918 P.2d at 1258.
139. Id. at 1259.
20081 175
176 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:161
her to perform fellatio. 4 ' She fought back and screamed, causing him
to leave the store.1
4 1
A psychiatrist determined he had a sexual dysfunction revolving
around exhibitionism and the need to see fear or shock in another
person. 4 2 A jury convicted him, but it was overturned on appeal. 43
At that time, the prosecutor accepted a guilty plea to aggravated
sexual battery for his time served: four years.4 However, only days
from Crane's release, the prosecutor began proceedings to have him
civilly committed, which were successful. 1
45
The state interpreted the law to require only showing he had a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that made him more likely
to continue that behavior in the future (his sexual dysfunction) and
that he had been convicted of one sexual crime (his plea to aggravated
sexual assault). 46 The case made it to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari to "revisit[] the question of the Act's constitution-
ality" because Crane's case was very different from Hendricks's. 47
Crane was better able to control himself, was less likely to re-offend,
and was suffering from antisocial personality disorder, a very com-
mon mental abnormality in prisons that is almost untreatable.148 This
raised the very concerns Kennedy had warned of in his concurrence
in Hendricks.
49
In Kansas v. Crane, the Supreme Court read an additional voli-
tional requirement into the Kansas law. 50 After Crane, not only does
the state have to show that the defendant committed a sexual crime
and has a mental abnormality making him more likely to recommit
the same type of crimes, but the state must also show that the men-
tal abnormality cannot be controlled by the defendant.' 5 ' The state
is not required to prove a complete lack of control, but the holding
requires that states prove at least some lack of control on part of the
Defendant.'5
140. Id.; Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2230.
141. State v. Crane, 918 P.2d at 1259.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1256, 1274.
144. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2231.
145. Id. at 2231-32.
146. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286-88 (Kan. 2000); Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2232.
147. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2243.
148. Id.
149. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring); In re
Crane, 7 P.3d at 291-92.
150. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,411-13 (2002); Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2232.
151. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
152. Id.; Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2232.
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The majority stressed that such findings keep the Act constitu-
tional by distinguishing between those eligible for civil commit-
ment and those who must be dealt with exclusively through
ordinary criminal proceedings. 'That distinction is necessary lest
'civil commitment' become a 'mechanism for retribution or gen-
eral deterrence' - functions properly those of criminal law, not
civil commitment." 153
This holding shows raised awareness of the ways the Act has been
misapplied since 1997, but it does not go far enough in narrowly tai-
loring these laws to only those who are truly the most dangerous to
society. "Despite the constitutional importance of only committing
those with 'serious difficulty' controlling themselves, the Supreme
Court neither clarified where to draw that critical line nor specified
whether existing state procedures comport with the lack of volitional
control requirement.""s What it did suggest was the need to question
whether allowing a broad mental abnormality like antisocial person-
ality disorder to be the basis of these civil commitments was wise.'55
After Crane, states have used the ambiguity of this case to either
keep or only slightly alter their commitment laws for sexual offend-
ers.'56 This ignores the fact that by vacating the Kansas Supreme
Court's decision in Crane, the Supreme Court was actually requiring
states to implement additional safeguards in their systems to assure
that only those who showed a true lack of control could be commit-
ted.5 7 That has not happened.158
2. Texas's Unusual Approach to Civil Commitment
In 1999, "[t]he Texas Legislature. . . added Chapter 841 to the
Health and Safety Code and created the nation's first out-patient
civil commitment program for sexually violent predators."159 Texas
is the only state that does not involuntarily commit sexual predators
to hospitals or inpatient treatment facilities."8 Instead, as a part of
their outpatient program, SVPs must sign a contractual agreement
concerning their residence, drug use, vocation, and sexual activities,
and any violation of this contract is considered a third degree felony."'
153. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2245 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2245-47.
156. Id. at 2248.
157. Id. at 2248-50.
158. Id. at 2248-49.
159. Curry, supra note 12, at 404.
160. Hall, supra note 12, at 176, 186.
161. Id. at 176, 187.
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Texas's statutory language is almost identical to those of Kansas
and Washington, all defining an SVP as a repeat sex offender.162 The
only difference is that where Kansas and Washington use the phrase
"mental disease or defect," Texas uses the phrase "behavioral abnor-
mality."6 3 Texas's reasoning also mirrors Kansas and Washington:
the legislature determined there was a small segment of the popula-
tion that could not be treated, and that it was in the best interest of
the state to commit those offenders to keep them from repeating their
sexual crimes.'
Although the Texas statute reads exactly like the Kansas statute,
the Texas legislature has enacted vastly different procedures.'65 SVPs
sign a contract in which they agree to reside in a state residential
facility (a half way house), abstain from the use of alcohol or con-
trolled substances, participate in treatment, submit to tracking or
other supervision, and some ninety-seven other obligations.'66 SVPs
are also monitored with tracking devices and must maintain certain
restrictions on entertainment, sexual activity, and contact with chil-
dren, just to name a few.'67
Texas's program commits around fifteen SVPs each year, and
spends considerably less money on each one than any other state with
SVP laws: around $15,000 per year per SVP compared to $100,000
per year per SVP in other states.'68 This is accomplished by "incor-
porat[ing] intensive treatment and case management, coupled with
the use of global positioning satellite tracking of SVPs."'69 This allows
the state to avoid the costs of state-run inpatient facilities, while en-
suring participation in the program. 70 Also keeping costs down are
the low numbers: while Kansas and Washington currently have hun-
dreds of SVPs committed to state inpatient programs, by 2006, Texas
had committed only about sixty-eight to its outpatient program. 171
So far, this approach has been hig hly praised and widely accepted
as successful.' Of the sixty-eight people committed by 2006 "[t]wenty-
seven.., are currently living in the community. Twenty-nine have
162. See Curry, supra note 12, at 403-04; Hall, supra note 12, at 186.
163. See Curry, supra note 12, at 404; Hall, supra note 12, at 186.
164. See Curry, supra note 12, at 404.
165. Hall, supra note 12, at 186-88.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Curry, supra note 12, at 405.
169. Id.
170. Id. (pointing out that refusing to participate in treatment in Texas can be a third
degree felony).
171. Hall, supra note 12, at 211; see Curry, supra note 12, at 405.
172. Hall, supra note 12, at 211-12.
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returned to prison. Five have returned to prison twice. None of the
violations leading to re-arrest or re-incarceration involved a sexual
offense." 173 Even psychologists, who in general have been adverse to
commitment laws for sexual predators,174 have responded positively
to Texas's program:
Dr. Rahn Bailey, a psychiatrist who frequently serves on the multi-
disciplinary team assessing alleged SVPs [in Texas], has praised
the state's "moderate approach." While acknowledging that contro-
versy exists among clinical professionals about this type of commit-
ment, Dr. Bailey wrote, '"Texas, by using the least restrictive
alternative of outpatient treatment is able to provide civil com-
mitment at a greatly diminished cost." Other writers have praised
this "innovative" program, even suggesting that, if successful, "it
should serve as model for other states and communities."
175
However, despite its apparent successes and admittedly less restric-
tive approach, Texas still faces the same fundamental constitutional
and therapeutic issues as Kansas and other states with inpatient
programs.
C. The Dangers in Either Kansas or Texas
The blurring of the line between civil proceedings and criminal
punishments gives prosecutors the ability to make an "[e]nd [r]un"
around the Constitution to make sentences longer and avoid due pro-
cess.176 "Commitment... places a too-powerful tool in the hands of
prosecutors, who may use it punitively to effectively lengthen crimi-
nals' detention; such legal moves imperil the principle that criminal
sentences should be predictable and final." 17 7 Prosecutors face over-
whelming pressure to please the people who elect them, and as the
number of sex crimes rise in number and media attention, this pres-
sure is destined to grow even stronger. 171 "Public pressure and chang-
ing policies may also motivate states to use commitment to alter
sentences and parole decisions previously determined."'
' 79
173. Id. (footnotes omitted).
174. See generally APA, supra note 85 at 171; Rich Daly, Lawmakers Reject Civil
Commitment for Sex Offenders, PSYCHIATRIC NEws, Mar. 17, 2006, at 21, http://pn
.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/41/6/21.
175. Hall, supra note 12, at 211 (citations omitted).
176. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2253-56.
177. Id. at 2251.
178. Introduction, supra note 84, at 3; Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2253.
179. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2253.
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One example is Crane, where "the prosecutor felt 'the system'
had cheated him out of the thirty-five year to life sentence he had
earlier secured and so he sought to augment Crane's detention using
a less-rigid alternative venue" of civil commitment.'18 When this hap-
pens and commitment merely becomes a way to overcome "an adverse
criminal ruling," the supposedly civil state interest in protecting its
citizens is merely transformed into another means of seeking criminal
punishment. 8 ' In his concurrence in Hendricks, Justice Kennedy
stated: "If the civil system is used simply to impose punishment
after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal
side, then it is not performing its proper function."'82 The same can
be said for imposing additional punishment at the end of a legitimate
prison sentence. If we allow prosecutors to punish sexual offenders
who did not receive a strong sentence or got off on a technicality by
having those offenders committed, then commitment is not serving
its proper function: to protect society from those sex offenders who are
truly dangerous and unwilling or unable to control their sexually
violent desires.'
83
While it is perhaps easy to understand a prosecutor's frustration
with light sentences and public pressure from the media, the use of
civil commitments to extend punishments in this way only makes
commitment completely criminal and punitive.'" Of course, the
Supreme Court ruled that these commitments were not punishment
and could not be used as a way to extend unfavorable sentences or
confinements of offenders.'85 And it is also clear that not every per-
son who has been committed under these laws was so committed out
of the prosecutor's desire for a longer sentence:'"6 Hendricks had a
forty-year history of sexual offenses and fully admitted he could not
control his behavior.'' He is perhaps a good example of the intended
target and function of these laws, and he truly might be better served
and treated in a hospital or commitment facility than in society.
18s
When we give prosecutors the ability to commit sexual offenders in
this way, we give them an "enormous power" that, as shown in Crane
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2254.
182. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183. See Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2240, 2256 (discussing the "potential for abuse"
in "undo[ing] the finality of criminal sentences").
184. Id. at 2255.
185. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
186. See Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2256 ("Clearly, civil commitment is not always
punitive, as evidenced by Hendricks.").
187. Id. at 2240.
188. Id. at 2240, 2256.
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and other cases,"' carries a "very real potential for abuse.""' The
sheer increase in the number of commitments suggests that prose-
cutors may start seeking commitment at the end of any sexual of-
fender's sentence, with no regard to true dangerousness, because of
public demand, personal regard for the sentence, or general desire
for a bright line procedural rule.'9 '
III. THE LESSONS THE YELLOW WALLPAPER MAY HOLD FOR
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
A. Diagnosis and Recidivism
While reading The Yellow Wallpaper, "almost from the first
[moment, the narrator's language] serve [s] to call into question both
the diagnosis of her condition and the rules established to treat it"
because the reader can see that she does not get better, and in fact
gets worse.'92 A close look at the SVP laws and the way they are
applied also calls into question both the validity of the mental ab-
normalities men are diagnosed with under SVP laws and the process
by which they are committed. The Yellow Wallpaper was Gilman's
"critique of a real medical treatment" that, while not mandated by
law, was applied in a similar fashion to the SVP civil commitment
laws: as a form of civil commitment in the home by doctors and hus-
bands who had legal control over the woman and her freedom.'93 This
note is a critique of real laws that partially incorporate real medical
treatments and beliefs, but only so far as they facilitate the purpose
of the laws being drafted. The law chooses to ignore the other side
of the very mental diagnoses used in statutes as incompatible with
the law.
The narrator in The Yellow Wallpaper was "sentence[d]" to
"isolation, deprivation, and alienation" under the rest cure, which
exacerbated her mental disorders and led ultimately to her psychotic
break.' Civil commitment of SVPs also leads to isolation, depriva-
tion, and alienation of the offender, which may in the end increase
189. Id. at 2256. For details of the case that inspired this note, see 48 Hours Mystery:
Dangerous Reunion (CBS Television broadcast Aug. 11, 2007) (text available at: http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/09/48hours/main2552787.shtml).
190. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2256 ("Although hopefully few prosecutors act
as Crane's did, civil commitment - so long as it is permitted to complement, not sub-
stitute... criminal punishment - is simply too tempting a blank check to afford the
government.").
191. See id.
192. Treichler, supra note 22, at 66.
193. See id. at 68-69.
194. Id. at 69.
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chances of recidivism. If offenders undergoing legally mandated treat-
ment have no opportunity to participate meaningfully in their own
treatment or any reason to hope that what they are learning can
make them a meaningful part of society again, the tools and rules
they learn are essentially meaningless.
The narrator in The Yellow Wallpaper was "infantilize[d]" by her
husband and her doctors, made to believe she could not know what
was best for her or what caused her condition.'95 Sexually violent
predator laws also create a class of convicted criminals outside the
criminal justice system who have been infantilized and told they
cannot control or take care of themselves. When reading The Yellow
Wallpaper, the reader begins to wonder if the narrator's "hysteria"
is a sham diagnosis or worse, "socially constituted."'96 After reading
the many statutes and debates that rage across this country concern-
ing SVPs, it is also easy to wonder if antisocial personality disorder,
paraphilia, and pedophilia, while real diseases, are essentially sham
diagnoses for commitment purposes.'97 "'No one is quite sure what
counts as a mental disorder'. . .. If no one can be sure of that, how
can courts rely on psychiatric diagnoses to incarcerate offenders who
have served their sentence?" 98
These concerns arise primarily because "many sex offenders do
not easily fit any of the categories defined in the ... Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM," which 'lists a
range of ... paraphilias" defined as "intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges or behaviours that recur over a period of at
least six months."'99 Included in this category are "[s]exual sadism"
and "paedophilia" but "only a small minority of rapists have sadistic
fantasies," and not all persons who sexually abuse children are nec-
essarily "paedophiles."2 00 Currently, in Minnesota, there are more
SVPs diagnosed with paraphilia then ever before, and it seems to
have become the diagnosis of choice for SVP commitments over the
last decade.2 ' Many SVPs that are committed have also been diag-
nosed with pedophilia, but as suggested above, any sexual harm of
195. Bauer, supra note 5, at 131; Crewe, supra note 54, at 49.
196. Treichler, supra note 22, at 70.
197. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2246-47 (discussing the term "antisocial personality
disorder" being used too broadly); Peter Aldhous, Special Report Sex Offenders: Throwing
Away the Key, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 21, 2007 at 6-8, http://www.newscientist.com/article
.ns?id=mg19325924.200 (suggesting the terms paraphilia and pedophilia are applied too
broadly).
198. Aldhous, supra note 197, at 8 (quoting Eric Janus of the William Mitchell College
of Law).
199. Id. at 7.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 8.
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a child does not necessarily correlate to the level of fascination and
obsession with children a diagnosis of pedophilia would normally
require under the DSM.2 °2
The biggest lesson of Gilman's story is that when medicine infan-
tilizes adults, ignores their role in their own treatment, and broadly
applies a treatment regimen with no individualized tailoring, it can
backfire in the most dramatic fashion.2"3 Applying that lesson of pri-
vate commitment to state mandated civil commitment is telling: apply
a vague statute to a too broad class of former convicts, teach offenders
they cannot control themselves, and take away hard-earned liberty,
and it will backfire. In fact, it has not seemed to serve its purpose of
protecting society from sexual crimes: "On top of its implications for
the civil liberties of the people who would otherwise have been re-
leased, the practice is estimated to cost more than a quarter of a
billion dollars a year to implement and does little to reduce levels of
sexual abuse or rape in society."204 According to a recent survey con-
ducted by Adam Deming of the Indiana Sex Offender Management
and Monitoring Program, "[b]y May 2006,3646 individuals were be-
ing held in the US under these laws .... 2627 [of whom] had been
committed as dangerous sexual predators ... ,20" Of the "3493
offenders detained since 1990" only "427 ... had been released by
2004 .... ,2o6
The United States Bureau of Justice Statistics studied a group
"of more than 270,000 prisoners released in 1994 across 15 states."207
Sex offenders made up "about 4 per cent of those released . ,, 20.
After three years, sex offenders were found to be "on average about
four times as likely to be arrested for a subsequent sex offence as
those previously jailed for other crimes." 20 9 However, because they
made up such a small percentage of the released men actually studied,
"sex offenders still accounted for only a minority of the sex crimes
committed by the group as a whole: of the ex-cons subsequently
202. Id. at 7-8.
203. See Roxanne Lieb, State Policy Perspectives on Sexual Predator Laws, in
PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND
THERAPY, supra note 8, at 41, 58 (suggesting that if courts are going to commit SVPs,
"[individualized treatment plans are necessary ... .); Weinstock, supra note 6, at 10.
204. Aldhous, supra note 197, at 6. "So do these laws protect the public? Statistics on
sex crimes suggest they do not to any great extent." Id. at 9.
205. Id. at 6.
206. Id. at 7 (citing statistics produced in a survey conducted by Roxanne Lieb of the
Washington State Institute for Public Policy in Olympia).
207. Id. at 9.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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arrested for sexual offences, 87 per cent had previously been impris-
oned for some other type of crime."21 In fact, studies of larger urban
centers show that "most sex crimes are committed by people who have
never been convicted of any crime.. . 79 per cent of those charged
with rape had no prior felony convictions."2 1
These recidivism rates are probably surprising to the public,212
however, our tools of predicting recidivism are sadly lacking.213 Even
using our best prediction tools the outcomes suggest that "40 per cent
of those kept locked up would not have been reconvicted within 15
years had they been released instead."214 For the most part, clini-
cians cannot agree on when a person is likely to recidivate and often
make poor assessments in the first place, even though most civil com-
mitment proceedings rely on these assessments.215 If our best statis-
tical evidence is heavily flawed or just imperfect, it should make
sense that this harsh, liberty restricting process should be limited
to only those offenders whom all evidence and all clinicians agree
are too dangerous to control themselves in society. These laws are so
controversial because despite these findings, more and more people
previously convicted of any kind of sex crime, no matter how severe,
are being subjected to this civil remedy.216
Just as John, the narrator's husband in The Yellow Wallpaper,
dismissed and devalued her self-perceptions and the best course of
treatment, so do our current laws dismiss and devalue sex offenders
and the observations and recommendations of the APA. Psychologists
disfavor commitment because it tends to "lump[] multiple patient
populations together, including those with antisocial personality dis-
order, who may not benefit from such treatment." 217 They also reject
the process of commitment of sex offenders as a "'misuse of a pro-
cess long used to treat people with mental illness."'218 In 1999, an
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2256-57.
Apparently much of the impetus for sex offender commitment laws was
rooted in the mistaken impression that sex offenders are more likely to
recidivate than other criminals. In fact, the opposite is true: Rapists... are
only half as likely... as other violent probationers to commit a new felony
within three years of release.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
213. Aldhous, supra note 197, at 8.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 9.
216. See id. at 8 (discussing the increase in paraphilic diagnoses and civil commitment
in Minnesota).
217. Daly, supra note 174, at 21.
218. Id. (quoting Jonathan Weker, M.D. of the Vermont Psychiatric Association).
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APA task force report denied support for the use of commitment
because it "misused psychiatry to detain a class of people for whom
confinement rather than treatment was the real goal." '219 Mental
health professionals also "stress that being a sexual offender does
not necessarily make you mentally ill according to any recognised
criteria."220 Just as abusing children does not necessarily make some-
one a pedophile22' - although the public may believe otherwise -
an offender's "persistent criminal behaviour" or persistent criminal
sexual behavior, does not make them mentally ill.222 "'The behaviour
itself is not enough to make the diagnosis .... 22
B. A Reason to Hope
Not all Americans believe that previous sex offenders should be
locked up indefinitely, and a growing number believe the best remedy
for sexual offenders is return to the community. For example, there
is a trailer park in St. Petersburg, Florida that has allowed hundreds
of paroled sex offenders to live as normal a life as possible.224 The
park is far enough from schools, parks, and playgrounds to accom-
modate registration and GPS restrictions imposed on many sex of-
fenders in the country, and has been attracting attention from sex
offenders not originally from St. Petersburg.225 The manager offers
them more than cheap rent including the cost of utilities: she offers
them therapy and tries to "help them become part of society again." 
226
CNN interviewed a resident, a former sex offender named Michael,
who called the park paradise and stated in an interview that without
the park, a place to live a more normal life, he would likely be back
in jail for something as simple as not alerting his parole officer to a
change of address.227
"Some experts agree that it is hope as much as fear that keeps
offenders from relapsing."' According to Dr. Don Sweeney, a psy-
chologist who worked with the trailer park residents, "'You have to
219. Id.
220. Aldhous, supra note 197, at 8.
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 8.
223. Id. (quoting Michael Frist of Columbia University).
224. Rich Phillips, Trailer Park Becomes 'Paradise'for Sex Offenders, CNN, Oct. 18,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/lO/17/trailer.sexoffender/.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Interview by John Zarrella with Michael, A Convicted Sex Offender, in St.
Petersburg, Fla. (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007IUS/10/17/trailer.sexoffender/
#cnnSTCVideo (companion video interview to Phillips's article).
228. Phillips, supra note 224.
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offer people hope if you expect them to change' . . . . 'If society
only wants to tear them down and doesn't show them any way back,
then all help is lost in their minds, and they are more likely to re-
lapse."'229 That is exactly what Victorian society did to women suf-
fering from "nervous disorders" like the narrator in The Yellow
Wallpaper: it tore them down, made them feel worthless, and then
expected them to recover through mere rest. Now, we take sex offend-
ers and either try to have them committed or force them to live with
numerous restrictions on their actions even after they are paroled,
in stark contrast to the way persons who commit other crimes are
treated.23 °
If we kept these restrictions, but also provided individualized
treatment and allowed offenders to feel as though they were a part of
society, as though they could eventually have a place again in society,
then recidivism rates would drop. Most sex offenders who have been
in jail do not want to return,231 but when you strip people of the hope
that they will ever get better or that society will ever accept that they
are changed, then of course they are going to end up back in the crim-
inal justice system. The manager of the St. Petersburg trailer park
knows there is no way to tell which of her residents will commit
crimes again, but she is willing to give them a chance. 2 In all of the
years she has been managing the park, only one man has tried to
commit another sexually motivated crime, and a fellow sex offender
resident turned him in.23
Living in society, with all the social pressures and expectations
that come with it, can really help people further rehabilitate. If com-
mitting sexual offenders, with little reliable information that they are
actually dangerous or likely to recidivate, is such a huge burden on
society and the Constitution, why not devise a system that offers a
little hope? After all, as Stephen King once wrote, "hope is a good
thing,... maybe the best of things ... 2' And maybe, just maybe,
if our treatment regimes were more individually tailored and took
into account the willingness and ideas of sexual offenders, they would
be much less likely to re-offend than they are under the current law
and after being civilly committed.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. STEPHEN KING, Rita Hayworth and Shawshank Redemption, in DIFFERENT
SEASONS 15, 105 (1982).
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IV. CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVES
Instead of committing people at the end of their criminal sen-
tences, there are many alternatives that could satisfy the public need
for protection and justice, while still reducing the costs of housing so
many criminals, and that could reduce the likelihood of recidivism
with individualized treatment and a dash of hope. The first alterna-
tive has been suggested by many other authors: if criminals have
such profound mental abnormalities that they will prove dangerous
to society once released, perhaps they should be committed in lieu
of any criminal sanctions in order to protect society and to keep the
true distinction between civil and criminal law.235 This system has
been in place for years, and can certainly keep those who are truly ill
and dangerous segregated from the public.236 This is not a popular
alternative, however, because society feels perpetrators are somehow
escaping punishment for their actions by being committed before
ever serving time in prison.237
The second alternative is actually a combination of changes to
the criminal justice system. First, sex crimes should be separated by
type and severity. Currently, repeated child molestation and statu-
tory rape involving consenting teenagers are both considered sex
crimes.238 Obviously, society abhors one much more than the other.
Accordingly, the crimes that society finds truly heinous - child
molestation, serial rape, and other more seriously violent crimes -
should be the only kind of crimes where the perpetrators are labeled
sexual predators after they are released from jail. This distinction
should also play into sentencing guidelines. Because of public percep-
tion and outcry, it is obvious that prison terms for all sexual crimes
should be lengthened.239 The sentences for those two or three crimes
that society particularly abhors should be particularly harsh. If jail
terms were extended, the public would not have to worry about a
feared sexual predator or sexual pervert being released from jail after
only a few years, it would make the public feel safer, and it would
reflect how seriously these crimes are taken in our country.
On top of longer prison terms, there should be no opportunity for
parole for sex offenders.24° This is one of the reasons so many people
235. Lieb, supra note 203, at 41-42.
236. Id. at 41.
237. Id. at 42 (explaining that committed offenders spend "considerably less time in
confinement than those who were imprisoned").
238. See Fitch & Hammen, supra note 96, at 29 (reflecting on the disparities among
the actual acts committed and the similarities among the punishments for those offenses).
239. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2263.
240. See id. at 2253-54 (discussing how public pressure may cause states to use civil
commitments to alter parole decisions).
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have been committed in the last few years and also one of the rea-
sons commitment is dangerous in the hands of prosecutors who feel
jilted by hard won sentences reduced by parole.241 It is also likely
that if a twenty-five year sentence actually lasted a full twenty-five
years instead of four or five, the public would not feel so afraid or so
frustrated with the system.
While in prison, sex offenders (and even other kinds of criminals)
should be offered the option of individual or group treatment so that
once their full sentences have been completed, they are more pre-
pared to be out in society and have more hope that they will be able
to stay there and not return to jail.242 As a part of a sex offender's
sentence, it would be wise to incorporate a period of parole after the
whole sentence has been served: perhaps a parole length of two to
five years. In the first few years monitoring would be more intense
and perhaps would involve registration and GPS monitoring systems
that are also currently used for paroled sex offenders, mandatory
individual treatment sessions, and other similar requirements.243 In
the last few years of parole, as the person spends more time in society,
those requirements and restrictions should be periodically lessened,
but treatment should continue to be available on either a mandatory
or voluntary basis. If the particular person's sexually violent im-
pulses are less likely than others' to be lessened by treatment, there
could be other kinds of social training or monitoring in place.
These alternatives serve dual functions: they protect society and
remove fears of sex offenders being freely released into communities,
and also allow sex offenders a role in their treatment and give hope
that they will not re-offend and will be able to have a meaningful
place in society. Once a person has served a prison sentence, the debt
to society has been paid. Perhaps if these alternatives were actually
used, society would feel comforted by that debt and release would
seem more justified. Commitment is done to protect society, but
there is little evidence to prove that it works. 44 Sex offenders are al-
ready a small population of released prisoners, and only a minority
of those released prisoners are sent back to jail for committing
241. Id. at 2253-56.
242. Id. at 261-62; see, e.g., APA, supra note 85 at 177; Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws,
in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND
THERAPY, supra note 8, at 213, 226.
243. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text for a comparison of how these
suggestions are similar to Texas's unique system, but without the need for actual
commitment.
244. See Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2256-57.
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sexual crimes.245 Perhaps if society were less judgmental and more
willing to give second chances, recidivism rates would go down and
maybe, like in the St. Petersburg trailer park, sexual predators would
be more apt to monitor themselves.
CONCLUSION
When Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote The Yellow Wallpaper, the
most influential medical minds believed women's bodies and minds
were inferior to men's, and that reading, work, and education could
cause women serious mental maladies.24 They implemented treat-
ments like the rest cure, in which women were isolated and left to
sleep, eat, and do little else in order to cure mental problems and re-
integrate these women into appropriate Victorian Society.247 Today,
a majority of the public and law makers believe that the only way
to protect society from sexual criminals is to commit them after they
have served their criminal sentences for indefinite periods of time.24
If sexual predators really do suffer mental illnesses, locking them
up, sequestering them, giving them their own modern rest cure of
sorts, and stripping them of hope will cause recidivism and further
mental breakdown.
The narrator of The Yellow Wallpaper was trapped metaphorically
in a marriage she did not know how to deal with and trapped literally
in a room at the top of stairs in a house in the isolated country."'
Authors have suggested that she was infantilized by her husband and
the medical community - the rest cure was meant to make her give
up all control over herself and her life and to let people who knew
better for her to take care of her.2" That is exactly what is now being
done to men committed as SVPs. Society locks them away, removes
all control over their own recovery and puts it in hands of doctors
and judges. Moreover, society strips them of hope that they will be
reformed and be able to be a part of society after having paid their
debt in jail.
In a society which values liberty so highly, we cannot and should
not commit people for thoughts or actions which may happen at an
indeterminate date in the future or may never happen at all. We
245. Aldhous, supra note 197, at 9.
246. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of Victorian
women's physical and mental constitutions).
247. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the rest cure).
248. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2256-57.
249. See supra Part I.
250. Treichler, supra note 22, at 65.
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should not strip people of the hope of reintegrating into society if we
ever hope to see a reduction in our prison populations. No one wants
to see women or children fall victim to sexual crimes, but there is no
real proof that commitment protects anyone.25' In fact, if some of the
suggested alternatives were implemented, not only would society
potentially be safer from these criminals, but we would also reduce
the costs, both socially and financially, of sequestering an entire seg-
ment of our population.
This is a very controversial area of public policy where alterna-
tives to the current system are available, but these alternatives re-
quire fundamental shifts in thinking that are not easy, and because
they are not easy, they will not be popular. The kinds of suggested
alternatives would require a rejuvenation of our prison and criminal
justice systems - where the option of parole did not exist for certain
crimes, where it was not more dangerous to live in prison than out-
side, and where people with legitimate mental illness could be treated
and not isolated until they lose all hope.
There are fundamental contradictions in this area of the law: the
public wants sexual criminals to be punished to the fullest extent of
the law and views commitment as an extension of punishment, but
the Supreme Court recognizes that the only constitutional kind of
civil commitment for SVPs cannot be punishment.252 Laws tend to
focus less on treatment and more on prevention, but by using mental
illnesses as categories for commitment, the law assumes treatment
of this mental abnormality is the only way a person can be success-
fully returned to the public:
the mismatch between public perceptions and crime statistics is
at the root of the problem. People are appalled by sex offending,
but do not like to acknowledge that it is widespread throughout
society. So the public and media demonise convicted offenders,
and politicians devise laws such as civil commitment in response.
"It's a way of articulating society's condemnation of sexual vio-
lence without doing anything fundamental about it. . 253
Society prefers these laws because they believe, mistakenly, that
commitment prevents recidivism. 54 But most rapes, for example,
251. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (suggesting that recidivism rates
of sexual offenders are significantly lower than publicly perceived).
252. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
253. Aldhous, supra note 197, at 9 (quoting Eric Janus of William Mitchell College of
Law).
254. Pfaffenroth, supra note 116, at 2256-57.
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are committed by people who have never set foot in jail for a felony
255
conviction.
Civil commitment of sexual predators is meant for only the most
dangerous, most predatory former convicts, who are least likely to
be able to control their actions."' Unfortunately under current laws,
the procedure is used much more widely.257 Even though the laws
have been upheld as constitutional, those constitutional affirma-
tions are very limited, and the danger of these laws is that now that
they have been approved, prosecutors will use them more broadly
than the Supreme Court intended. It is natural to have fears that
men who once sexually abused people will continue to do so once they
are released from prison, but it is time to stop running this country
on fear.
Women like Charlotte Perkins Gilman found a way to fight back
against the socially instituted treatment regimen of the rest cure,
which today is widely recognized as an improper medical treatment.
[T]he most profound message in 'The Yellow Wallpaper'. . . is
the one about how women's problems are constantly individual-
ized: it is the individual woman who has the problem, and, even
if many individual women have the same problem, the explana-
tion of a defective psychology rather than that of a defective social
structure is usually preferred."'
One day, a hundred years from now, perhaps society will also look
back on the commitment of SVPs as medically inappropriate and
wonder how it ever became the socially instituted procedure. The
Yellow Wallpaper, long considered a shining beacon of feminism,
serves now also as a different approach to understanding sexual
offenders and how to better treat them for themselves as individuals,
and for our society as a whole.
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